We study the dynamic e¤ects of …scal reforms on migration and tax evasion in an international context with two asymmetric countries. Given an initial international distribution of honest and dishonest tax payers, the tax system (e.g. tax rates and degrees of progressivity) and the salary in each country, individuals decide where to reside and how much time to spend working. The model allows us to study in a dynamic setting how the distribution of honest and dishonest earners is geographically affected by …scal reforms (e.g. variations in tax rates) and auditing e¤orts (e.g. probability of auditing and …nes) of di¤erent countries. We show that various dynamic long term scenarios can be generated. The particular convergence of the model depends crucially on the initial geographic distribution of dishonest agents. This implies that tax reforms that have been successful in reducing tax evasion in one country may produce very di¤erent results in others, if initial conditions are signi…cantly di¤erent. Chaotic cyclical behavior may also arise if individual propensity to migrate is su¢ ciently high.
Introduction
All around the world the wealth of economic agents is taxed by local and central governments to …nance expenditure in services to the population. Fiscal policy makers, in general, have to face the fact that taxes may in ‡uence individuals' economic behavior and, in many situations, they are a very important factor a¤ecting the …nancial decisions of households and …rms.
A particularly important issue connected to taxation is the possibility that some individuals may decide to report smaller earning or not pay taxes at all; in other words, they may decide to engage in forms of tax evasion. Tax evasion is a common and widespread problem that …scal policy makers face around the world. The traditional view in the economic literature originates from the economics of crime (Becker (1968) ) and is based on the idea that no individual, if allowed, would want to pay taxes. Indeed tax evasion has often been described as a gamble. 1 Recently, the economic literature has also started considering the fact that some individuals in the society may be inherently honest and, to some extent, may also obtain a positive utility from paying taxes. Due to the existence of some form of intrinsic motivation among tax payers, 2 some individuals may believe that paying taxes is a citizenship duty and a way to contribute to society's welfare. Of course, individuals'tax morale, i.e. their propensity to be intrinsically motivated toward honestly paying taxes, may be signi…cantly a¤ected by the way they see the actions of their governments. Indeed, in those countries in which governments are considered particularly corrupted or ine¢ cient, the intrinsic motivation of individuals to pay taxes may be very low. 3 Importantly, the inclination of taxpayers to honestly report their earnings may also be a¤ected by various aspects of a tax system. For instance, a tax system that includes strict auditing and harsh …nes may be seen as greedy and oppressive by the average taxpayer.
In an international context, …scal policy makers have to consider the possibility that economic agents may rationally decide to reside in countries in which the tax system has features that match their preferences. Indeed, the economic literature has shown signi…cant interest in understanding the relationship between tax competition and migration. Such relationship is a two-way one. On one hand, di¤erences in national tax systems may induce migration of economic agents; on the other, changes in other factors that a¤ect migration (such as costs of migration or skill di¤erentials) may in ‡uence, in turn, the way optimal taxes should be de…ned. The relationship between tax competition and migration has been studied in various papers - Mirrlees (1971) and (1982) , Borjas (1999) , Razin et al. (2002) , Bucovetsky (2003) , Simula and Trannoy (2010) looking for forms of optimal taxation when economic agents are allowed to migrate. Our paper contributes to the literature studying another important and, to our knowledge, scarcely explored relationship: the evolutionary connection between tax/auditing systems, tax evasion and migration. In other words, we study in a dynamic setting the way di¤erent taxation and auditing systems may a¤ect the migration decisions of individuals who intend to commit tax evasion. Speci…cally, we consider a two-country framework and assume that each country employs a di¤erent tax system (i.e. di¤erent rates and di¤erent degrees of progressivity). 4 In addition, we assume that economic agents can decide how much e¤ort to invest in economic activities and whether to migrate to a country with a more favorable tax system. An evolutionary model, in which the fraction of dishonest payers residing in each country is endogenized and updated according to expected utilities, provides the dynamics that we are going to discuss.
We show that various dynamic long term scenarios can be generated, including equilibria in which all dishonest individuals converge to one of the countries as well as equilibria where dishonest individuals are distributed in both countries. In addition, the stability of the equilibria may be a¤ected by overshooting; in particular, instability (chaotic cyclical behavior) may arise if individuals' propensity to migrate is su¢ ciently high. The particular convergence of the evolutionary process often depends crucially on the initial geographic distribution of dishonest agents. This provides an important caveat to …scal policymakers who may be considering to adopt …scal reforms that have been successful in other countries. The model shows that tax reforms that have been successful in reducing tax evasion in one country may produce very di¤erent results in another, if initial levels of tax evasion are signi…cantly di¤erent. Finally, we show that the particular evolutionary trajectory of tax evasion and migration that a country can experience critically depends on the level of progressivity of a tax system. In particular, we show that the progressivity of tax regime in ‡u-ences individuals'choices in terms of e¤ort and migration and this, in turn, has consequences on the ability of a country to generate tax revenues. Our analysis shows that a tendency to a ‡at rate system may have positive e¤ects on the tax revenues of a country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 introduces the evolutionary dynamics. Section 4 discusses the results and provides examples. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Assume there are two countries, say country 1 and country 2. Country 1 has a progressive tax system with two rates, t L and t H , 0 < t L < t H < 1. Thus, in country 1, if a worker earns more than a certain exogenous income level I, then she pays rate t H on the earnings exceeding I. The rate t L applies, instead, for earnings less than I. Country 2 has a ‡at tax system with tax rate 0 < t F < 1.
Agents are homogeneous with (pre-tax) utility given by
where e is e¤ort, w i is the wage in country i and e 2 2 represents the cost of e¤ort with parameter measuring e¤ort ine¢ ciency. Notice that in country 1, the cut-o¤ level of taxable income I can also be expressed in terms of a threshold level of e¤ort: I = e ew 1 . Let us assume that there are two types of individuals, i.e. cheaters (or dishonest agents) and honest tax payers. Cheaters are assumed to report always a level of income equal to zero and, if not audited, their utility is given by (1). If audited, cheaters pay the due amount plus a country-speci…c …ne, e m i , which is proportional to the e¤ort (and therefore the income earned).
Let us assume that honest taxpayers always declare the correct amount. We can now summarize the utilities of agents in the two countries in the following tables: With probability p i 2 [0; 1] an agent located in country i will be audited and we assume that the auditor identi…es correctly the taxable income.
It follows that the expected utility of a dishonest agent in country 1 is:
Note that the expected utility in country 1 as a function of the e¤ort e is continuous, but has a kink point at the threshold e e, due to the progressivity of the tax system. The (certain) utility of an honest agent in country 1 is:
if e e e
The expected utility of a dishonest agent in country 2 is:
Cheaters and honest taxpayers decide their e¤ort levels by solving an expected utility maximization problem. A dishonest agent in country 2, where a ‡at tax is imposed, will exert the level of e¤ort that maximizes (2), which is:
thus obtaining utility
Discarding the possibility of negative levels of e¤ort, i.e. assuming that
simple comparative statics analysis shows that e¤ort e 2 and corresponding expected utility E [U 2 ] decrease with , p 2 , t F and m 2 , and increase with w 2 . It is not particularly surprising that the e¤ort of a dishonest agent decreases if the auditing system becomes stricter (i.e. m 2 and p 2 increase) or the tax burden increases (i.e. higher t F ); an increase in also increases the costs of e¤ort and, therefore, reduces its provision. Clearly, e¤ort and utility of an honest agent in country 2, denoted by e + 2 , are obtained by setting p 2 = 1 and m 2 = 0 in (3) and (4) respectively.
An analogous computation holds for calculating the optimal e¤ort of a dishonest low income agent in country 1, with
and
If a cheater in country 1 exerts an e¤ort beyond the threshold I = e ew 1 , then the e¤ort level that maximizes E U H 1 is given by
with expected utility
Finally, if the cheater exerts an e¤ort equal to the threshold e e, his utility is given by
Notice that relationship e H < e L always holds. Again, assuming nonnegative e¤ort in country 1, changes in parameters have e¤ects on e L , e H , E U L 1 similar to what we have described above. In other words, an increase in the cost of e¤ort, the probability of auditing, tax rates and …nes have a negative e¤ect on e¤ort and expected utilities of dishonest agents. Increases in w 1 have a positive e¤ect instead.
The way E U H 1 is a¤ected by parameters, nonetheless, is less obvious. Still, increases in and m 1 have a negative e¤ect on E U H 1 , while w 1 increases expected utility. However, now the e¤ect that p 1 and t H have on the expected utility of high-e¤ort dishonest agents may be ambiguous. In addition, an increase in t L has a negative e¤ect on the expected utility (it decreases the tax relief provided by tax progressivity in the event tax evasion is detected), but not on e¤ort. Similarly, notice that an increase in the threshold e e has a positive e¤ect on E U In what follows, we are interested in cases in which probabilities p 1 and p 2 are not exogenously given, but are dynamically updated according to the share of cheaters in the two countries. Therefore, we will assume from now on the following restrictions on parameters, which guarantee that optimal e¤orts are non-negative for any level of probabilities p 1 and p 2 :
Working out the conditions for maximizing cheater's expected utility in country 1, E [U 1 (e)], his optimal e¤ort, denoted by e 1 , is
5 It is easy to show that assumptions (11) and (12) guarantee nonnegative optimal e¤orts (6), (8) and (3). For instance, consider (5) and notice that w 2 p 2 w 2 t F is strictly decreasing in p 2 , so that the minimum value of w 2 p 2 w 2 t F is at p 2 = 1, thus leading to (12). For (11), a similar reasoning applies.
The utility at the optimal e¤ort level for a cheater in country 1 is then
where
are given, respectively, in (9), (10) and (7). An analogous calculation holds for the optimal e¤ort e + 1 and maximized utility for a honest agent in country 1 by setting m 1 = 0 and p 1 = 1 in (13) and (14) respectively.
Next we address the following question. Given an initial distribution of cheaters in the two countries and given that cheaters may …nd pro…table to migrate in the country where their expected utility is greatest, should we expect migration between the two countries to be in ‡uenced by the di¤erent tax systems?
To answer this question, we specify an evolutionary setting with migration of dishonest taxpayers between countries, based on expected utility comparison between countries.
Evolutionary setting
In this section, we endogenize r, the fraction of cheaters deciding to reside in country 1, in order to study the migration of dishonest agents between the two countries.
We disregard the possibility of a change in the attitude of the agents from honest to cheater and vice-versa. In other words, we are assuming that each individual is innately either honest or dishonest (see Lamantia and Pezzino (2016) for a related example where individual behavior could indeed change). Of course, the proportion of honest/dishonest agents residing in a country can change in time because of migration. We disregard, however, any possible migration of honest taxpayers. This assumption clearly simpli…es the analysis and it is justi…ed by the fact that inherently honest tax payers tend to have signi…cant tax morale and, therefore, a closer connection with the country where they reside. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that honest tax payers may …nd more di¢ cult to migrate to a di¤erent country because of tax-related considerations compared to intrinsically dishonest agents.
Let us focus, therefore, on dishonest agents and consider the average payo¤ obtained by each of them in the two countries. It is reasonable to assume that at time t the probability of observing dishonest behavior in a country is approximated by the fraction r of dishonest agents in that country. Then, this probability is dynamically updated according to the gain in expected utilities produced by migration. The speci…c dynamics of the probability of being dishonest is modeled by the word of mouth evolutionary model, see Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Dawid (1999) . 6 6 A similar modeling structure as the one here proposed has been employed in evolutionary
To be more precise, suppose that at each (discrete) time period two dishonest agents meet and compare their utilities. Agents are homogeneous and set their e¤ort to maximize expected utility. Thus, if both agents reside in the same country, they obtain the same utility and there is no awareness of the advantages of migration. However, if a dishonest taxpayer living in country 1 meets a dishonest taxpayer of country 2, they could compare their utility and reconsider the country to live in. The higher the di¤erence in expected utilities of being dishonest in the two countries is, the more likely the dishonest agents will migrate to the country where expected utility is higher. De…ne as G the di¤erence of expected utilities:
Consider the probability to migrate from country 2 to country 1 given that G 0, and denote it by (G):
, being a probability distribution function, is non-decreasing in its argument G with
From now on, we denote by r the fraction of dishonest tax payers in country 1. All in all, the probability p 2!1 that a dishonest migrates from country 2 to country 1 is given by the probability that a dishonest of country 2 meets a dishonest of country 1, which is r, times the probability to change behavior, namely
from which it follows that the probability to remain in country 2 is p 2!2 = 1 p 2!1 . Analogously, a dishonest agent of country 1 migrate to country 2 with probability given by the probability that (s)he meets a dishonest of country 2, which is (1 r), times the probability that a dishonest of country 1 migrates to country 2 given the di¤erence in (15). Assuming that ( x) = 1 (x), the overall probability that a dishonest of country 1 migrates to country 2 is
with an obvious meaning of the notation. Finally, it is p 1!1 = 1 p 1!2 . Suppose that the probability that an agent is sampling another agent from the other country is linearly increasing with the number of dishonest agents in that other country and that a large number of sampling from the population oligopolies to investigate competition where players have di¤erent information sets or di¤erent objective functions, see Bischi et al. (2015) , Cerboni Baiardi et al. (2015) , Droste et al. (2002) , Kopel et al. (2014), De Giovanni and is taken. This way, the average utility di¤erence of the two behaviors is well approximated by the di¤erence of expected utilities in (15). Denote by r t the fraction of dishonest tax payers in country 1, where t emphasizes its dependence on time. Following Dawid (1999) , the dynamics of the probability r t can be written as follows:
in ‡ow share of m igration from country 2 to 1 r t p 1!2 | {z } out ‡ow share of m igration from country 1 to 2
which can be rewritten as the unidimensional map
is referred to as the "switching" function, see Bischi et al. (2003a,b) . Equation (16) can be interpreted as a balance equation, saying that in country 1 the fraction of dishonest agents at time t + 1, r t+1 , is increased by the expected fraction of dishonest agents that decide to migrate from country 2 to country 1, (1 r t ) p 2!1 , and decreased by the expected fraction of agents that decide to migrate from country 1 to country 2, r t p 1!2 .
M inherits from the following properties:
Moreover, being a distribution function, by the properties of the corresponding density (unimodality and symmetry), we can also assume that:
2. M is odd (symmetric with respect to 0);
M is increasing;
4. M is convex in ( 1; 0) and concave in (0; +1);
5. M is di¤erentiable at least in y = 0.
7 Map (17) has the following important property:
Monotonicity: For a given r t 2 (0; 1) it is r t+1 > r t [<] if and only if
By monotonicity of M (:), the sign of M (:) coincides with the sign of G, so that an increment (decrement) in the share r occurs if and only if G > 0 [< 0]. By this property, we can say that the dynamical system (17) is a particular example of monotone selection dynamics, see Cressman (2003) and Weibull (1995) for details.
Detection probabilities
In this Section, let us assume that in each country detection rates depend on the distribution of cheaters in the two countries; that is, probabilities to be audited in the two countries p 1 and p 2 depend on the distribution of cheaters r. In particular, we are assuming that in both countries auditing e¤orts tend to increase with the degree of tax evasion in that country.
Since p 1 = p 1 (r) and p 2 = p 2 (r), we can rewrite (15) as
so that word of mouth dynamics (17) becomes 
where = 2 r (1 r )M 0 (G(r )) ; r looses stability through a ‡ip bifurcation at G 0 (r ) = .
r is an unstable …xed point for (20) 
Proof : It follows from linearization of (20) around equilibrium, see Lamantia and Pezzino (2016) or De Giovanni and Lamantia (2016) for details.
Corner points r 0 = 0 and r 1 = 1 are also possible equilibria of (20). However, here the share of cheaters in the two countries plays a crucial role in determining the expected utilities through the detection probabilities. The study of local stability for equilibrium points r 2 (0; 1) of the map (20), where expected utilities in the two countries are equal, i.e. G(r ) = 0, can be ascertained by considering the slope of the function M (:) in (18). In particular, an equilibrium r such that G 0 (r ) > 0 is always unstable for (20), whereas when G 0 (r ) < 0, r is stable provided that no overshooting around the equilibrium takes place, as speci…ed by condition (21).
To provide a simple application, let us assume from now on that detection probabilities in each country are equal to the share of cheaters in that country, i.e. p 1 (r) = r and p 2 (r) = 1 r.
8 By employing (14), the di¤erence in cheaters' expected utilities for the two countries (19) becomes
with r < r. Notice that G(r) in (22) is continuous so that map (20) is piecewisesmooth.
9 Depending on the threshold e¤ort level e e, the following cases arise: 10 1. 0 < e e w1(1 t H ) m1 . Being r 1, in (22) it is G(r) = G H (r). This case describes the situation in which the e¤ort threshold is so low that all dishonest agents residing in country 1 will choose a high level of e¤ort.
2.
w1(1 t H ) m1 < e e w1(1 t L ) m1 . Being 0 < r < 1 and r 1, in the de…nition of G(r) in (22) only the branches G M (r) and G H (r) are employed. This case describes the situation in which the e¤ort threshold has increased to the point where, for some values of r, dishonest agents residing in country 1 will consider applying a level of e¤ort equal to e e.
3.
w1(1 t L ) m1 < e e < w1 . Being 0 < r < 1 and 0 < r < 1, all the three branches in (22), G L (r); G M (r) and G H (r), are employed. This case describes the situation in which the e¤ort threshold has further increased to the point where, depending of the speci…c values of r, dishonest agents residing in country 1 will consider applying a level of e¤ort equal to e e, e H , e L .
4. e e w1 . Being r 0, in (22) it is G(r) = G L (r). This case describes the situation in which the e¤ort threshold is so high that dishonest agents residing in country 1 will only apply a level of e¤ort equal to e L .
Observe that cases 1 and 4 are easier to analyze, but less interesting for our purposes: even if in principle in country 1 two tax rates are operative, cheaters choose the same level of e¤ort (high or low in cases 1 and 4 respectively) for any underlying distribution of cheaters in the two countries. Thus, in country 1 essentially only one tax rate applies to cheaters, which is t H or t L respectively.
Under case 1, where 0 < e e < w1(1 t H ) , it is G(r) = G H (r): cheaters migrate between the two countries, but in country 1 all cheaters exert high e¤ort, regardless of the prevailing share r. Thus in this case, the threshold level e e is so low that cheaters always …nd pro…table to exert an e¤ort above that level, even if it could result in paying the higher tax rate if audited.
When the level of salaries and the amount of punishment are equal in the two countries (w 1 = w 2 and m 1 = m 2 ), G H (r) is strictly decreasing in r 2 [0; 1] with G H (1) < 0 < G H (0) so that, by continuity, exactly one equilibrium r H , exists, which can be calculated by …nding a root r H that solves the second degree equation G H (r H ) = 0 in (22) and such that 0 < e e w1(1 t H ) m1 . Notice that r H depends on the threshold level of e¤ort e e. By the implicit function theorem, the equilibrium value r H is strictly increasing in the threshold level of e¤ort e e. This implies that, when parameters belong to case 1, an increase in e e has a positive e¤ect on the proportion of dishonest agents residing in country 1. This will also, in turn, a¤ect the tax revenues of the country, as we are going to show in section 4.1.
Analogously, under case 4, where e e w1 , being G(r) = G L (r), cheaters migrate between the two countries, but in country 1 all cheaters always exert low e¤ort as optimal choice independently on the prevailing share r. This is due to the fact that the threshold level for which the cheaters would pay the higher tax rate if audited is so high that it has no relevance in their optimal choice of e¤ort. From 
Equilibrium r L is meaningful provided that it belongs to the interval [0; 1] and that e e w1 . Moreover, it is G 0 L (r L ) < 0, which is relevant for understanding the local stability of equilibrium r L , as recalled below. From (24) we immediately obtain that, when the level of salaries and the amount of punishment are equal in the two countries (w 1 = w 2 and m 1 = m 2 ), then r L 2 (0; 1) for all possible values of tax rates t F 2 (0; 1), t L 2 (0; 1) and t H 2 (t L ; 1). In addition, r L is increasing in t F , w 1 and m 2 and decreasing in m 1 , t L and w 2 , as intuition suggests. Notice that, since r L describes the migratory behavior of low-e¤ort dishonest agents, it should not be surprising that the higher tax rate t H and the threshold level of e¤ort e e have no e¤ect on this equilibrium. Notice that, r L , di¤erently from r H , is also independent on the e¤ort ine¢ ciency . Now let us consider the remaining cases. Under case 2 cheaters migrate between the two countries, but in country 1 cheaters never exert low e¤ort as optimal choice. Under case 3, cheaters migrate between the two countries and exert low, high e¤ort or e¤ort at threshold e e as optimal choice as a function of the share r. Under equal punishment and wage levels in the two countries (w 1 = w 2 and m 1 = m 2 ), the branch G M (r) of (22) is strictly decreasing, so that if an equilibrium r M exists, obtained by solving the equation G M (r M ) = 0, it is unique; moreover, the equilibrium value r M , similarly to r H , depends on the value of the other parameters and, in particular, is strictly increasing with the threshold level of e¤ort e e. When the wage levels and the punishments in the two countries are not equal, numerical evidence shows that, for the economic meaningful ranges of the parameters of the model, zero or one equilibrium in the interval (0; 1) can be obtained. These equilibria are obtained by solving equation G i (r i ) = 0, provided that r i belongs to the interval for which G i (r) is employed with i 2 fL; M; Hg, according to the piecewise de…nition of G(r) in (22).
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By assumptions (11) and (12), and from the previous discussion, we can now apply Proposition 1 to equilibria r L , r M and r H so that, whenever one of them is feasible, it is locally asymptotically stable, provided that the non-overshooting condition in (21) holds. 13 In other words, even if wage levels and punishments were equal in the two countries, a fraction of cheaters would always be present in both countries. Depending on the established e¤ort level e e, the model can generate equilibria where cheaters in country 1 provide any type of e¤ort. In addition, in our model there may be con…gurations where migration will lead all cheaters to live in one country in the long run (either r = 0 or r = 1).
A full characterization of all equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper, but we will consider below the most interesting cases by numerical analysis. In the numerical simulations, we borrow from Bischi et al. (2003a,b) and Bischi et al. (2009) 
where = M 0 (0) > 0 is a parameter that model the intensity of choice, i.e. in our context the willingness to migrate to a di¤erent country for chasing utility di¤erential G(r) in (22). 14 can be interpreted as a measure of social integration between the two countries (that may or may not belong to a federal union) or an inverse measure of the costs of migration.
Let us start our discussion with an example with the most interesting scenario, where all three branches of G(r) are employed. This example, although numerical, provides a general description of the typical dynamics of the model. For this purpose, consider the following set of parameters w 1 = w 2 = 1:5; m 1 = m 2 = 0:4; t L = 25%; t H = 50%; t F = 40%; = 1 1 2 A virtual …xed point is a point that satis…es an equilibrium condition of the form G i (r i ) = 0, i 2 fL; M; Hg, but it is ruled out by the piecewise de…nition of the function G(r) in (22). For instance, a root r 2 (0; 1) of equation G H (r ) = 0 with e e w 1 is a virtual …xed point. 1 3 Note that analytically this holds when w 1 = w 2 and m 1 = m 2 , although numerical evidence suggests that it is also the case under the general case with w 1 6 = w 2 or m 1 6 = m 2 .
1 4 Notice that M (G(r)) in (25) satis…es all the requirements for M previously listed. In any case, it is important to observe that the qualitative properties of the dynamics do not depend on the exact speci…cation of M (G) but on the form of the utility di¤erential G(r) in (22), so that (25) is a useful way to obtain in explicit form a dynamical system that models migratory pressure.
and assume …rst that in country 1 it is e e = 0:8. Notice that it is r 0:6087 and r 0:9032, so case 3 holds. Solving equation G H (r H ) = 0, we obtain the root r H 0:544297 < r, which corresponds to an equilibrium of word of mouth dynamics (20) . No other equilibria are present under this parameters constellation. 15 The stability of r H only depends on the map M (G). With (25), the non-overshooting condition (21) is satis…ed for < = 4:609. Figure 1(a) shows the cobweb diagram for this case with = 1 and two di¤erent trajectories with initial conditions r A 0 = 0:2 and r B 0 = 0:8 converging to r H . The read dots in the bisector are the two levels r < r in the piecewise de…nition of map (22). Thus, about 54% of cheaters establish in country 1 and exert a level of e¤ort above e e, whereas the complementary fraction chooses country 2 in the long run. Dynamic adjustment related to migration between the two countries eventually leads to that distribution of cheaters in the two countries.
If the regulator in country 1 decides to increment the threshold e¤ort e e till the level at which r H = r (remember that r H is increasing in e e whereas r is decreasing in e e) this leads to r H becoming a virtual …xed point and the new equilibrium of the type r M , shown in Figure 1(b) for e e = 1, all other parameters equal, where r M 0:5623.
16 Equilibrium r M is again stable and it involves an higher amount of cheaters in country 1, who decide to exert an e¤ort that is exactly equal to the threshold e e. Further increments of e e leads to condition r M = r, so that r M is now a virtual …xed point and the only equilibrium is r L in (24), which is now independent on e e. This case is depicted in Figure 1(c) , where e e = 1:2 and r L 0:5634. Notice that in these examples the increments of e e entail small variations of the equilibrium values of cheaters in country 1. However, two observations are crucial here. The …rst one, detailed below, is related to the stability of the di¤erent equilibrium share of cheaters. The second one, discussed in Subsection 4.1, is related to variations of tax revenues in the two countries as a consequence of di¤erent levels of the e¤ort threshold e e. Regarding the stability of the equilibrium share of cheaters in country one, our leading example has been obtained under a su¢ ciently small willingness to migrate . When > , equilibria become unstable through a sequence of period-doubling bifurcations, and for increasing values of , chaotic motion occurs, with persistent oscillations of migration between the two countries, due to an high level of impatience of the agents. This occurrence is depicted in Figures  1(d) ,(e),(f), which correspond to the cases in Figures 1(a),(b) ,(c) but with the higher willingness to migrate = 60. Now a very small utility di¤erential is enough to induce a cheater to migrate in the country where he is better o¤; this leads to an erratic ‡uctuation of the share of cheaters and of the probability to be detected as cheater in the two countries, which changes the overall utility evaluation. Interestingly, migration, by changing the share of cheaters and so 1 5 Solving equation G M (r M ) = 0, one obtains the root r M = 0:542648, and, for G L (r L ) = 0, the root r L = 0:56338. However, as r M = 2 r; r and r L = 2 r; 1 both r M and r L are virtual …xed points for the word of mouth dynamics (20). (20) with (25), showing the transition of equilibria for increasing levels of e e, with parameters w 1 = w 2 = 1:5; m 1 = m 2 = 0:4; t L = 25%; t H = 50%; t F = 40%; = 1 (a) = 1 and e e = 0:8: the generic trajectory converges to r H . (b) = 1 and e e = 1: the generic trajectory converges to r M . (c) = 1 and e e = 1:2: the generic trajectory converges to r L . (d) = 60 and e e = 0:8: chaotic attractor with high and threshold e¤ort. (e) = 60 and e e = 1: chaotic attractor with high, threshold and low e¤ort (f) = 60 and e e = 1:2: chaotic attractor with low e¤ort. the probability to be detected, induces di¤erent e¤ort levels of cheaters in country one, i.e. below, at or above the threshold e e, so that over time di¤erent tax rates are applied to audited cheaters. This can be noticed by inspecting Figure  1(d) ,(e),(f). In Figure 1(d) , migration occurs chaotically, and cheaters always choose either high e¤ort or e¤ort at the threshold e e (the chaotic attractor is all below the point r); in the case of Figure 1(e) , any level of e¤ort can be exerted by cheaters, whereas, in the case of Figure 1 (f), although dynamics is erratic, all the points of the chaotic attractor are above the level r: cheaters in country 1 always exert a low level of e¤ort in order to pay the lower tax rate t L .
A useful way to summarize our leading example is depicted in the bifurcation diagram of Figure 2 as the threshold e e is increased. Figure 2 (a) shows the case with low migration propensity ensuring that the various equilibria of the model are locally asymptotically stable. As recalled before, an increase in the threshold e e has a positive e¤ect on E U (region I, below the green line, where G H (r) applies); this also occurs for r M (region II, between the green line and the blue line); clearly, further increments of e e have no in ‡uence on r L (region III, on the right of the blue line). Figure 2 (b) depicts the similar case with higher willingness to migrate ( = 60); dynamics is chaotic, but on average (see the red curve) the results are analogous to those in Figure 2 (a). Also in this case, for di¤erent values of e e, the trajectories of the system can belong to regions where the de…nition of the dynamical system is di¤erent. In other words, we can observe oscillations of the shares of cheaters in the two countries with the application of di¤erent tax rates to audited dishonest agents over time.
Next we address main implications of the choice of the tax system for the expected tax revenues of the two countries.
E¤ects on tax revenues
Here we brie ‡y consider the tax revenues to the two countries arising from auditing the whole population of taxpayers. Let us denote by the proportion of honest taxpayers living in country 1, so that 1 lives in country 2. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that they are not willing to migrate for …scal purposes.
17 Country i audits randomly agents from its population and incurs a …xed cost for auditing k i .
Net tax revenues in country 2 can be written as follows: where we employed the assumption that the probability to audit in country 2 is p 2 = 1 r. In Country 1 the calculation is analogous, but di¤erent tax rates are in place and agents choose optimal e¤ort also according to the e¤ort threshold e e. The tax revenues from honest and dishonest taxpayers are summoned up in the following tables:
Country 1 
Let us reconsider the numerical example described above and assume that k 1 = k 2 = 0:5 and = 0:5 (equal distribution of honest agents in the two countries). As T R 1 and T R 2 ultimately depend on the share r of cheaters in the two countries, it is interesting to depict the tax revenues in the two countries as a function of the share r.
When migration propensity is low (e.g. = 1), we have shown that in the long run the share of cheaters in the two countries converges to a stable equilibrium. This implies also that the tax revenues in the two countries stabilize to a …xed level for any given e
e. An increment of e e, however, will slightly increase and then reduce tax revenues in country 2, see Figure 3 (b). However, changes in e e may have a strong in ‡uence on the long-run tax revenues in country 1, as shown in Figure 3(a) : increasing e e initially determines a decrement and then an increment of T R 1 . For su¢ ciently high levels of e e, this threshold level does not have any in ‡uence on tax revenues in the two countries. In this speci…c example, it is also visible a discontinuity in the tax revenues of country 1, which is induced by the di¤erent e¤orts exerted by agents when they choose it above or below e e (see (13)). The non-monotonic shape of T R 1 is con…rmed by additional simulations that we are not reporting here for expositional reasons. In particular, T R 1 achieves always a minimum for intermediate levels of e e. The discontinuity of T R 1 depends, on the other hand, on the speci…c parameters constellation of this example. The intuition behind this result is as follows. When e e is low and the majority of cheaters are in country 2 (low r, see Figure  2 (a)), small increments of this threshold entail that cheaters residing in country 1 exert decreasing optimal e¤ort e H and that the share of cheaters in country 1, r, increases. The overall e¤ect is a decrease in tax revenues in country 1, given the low probability to detect dishonest agents. This tendency changes for larger values of e e as r is substantially increased, so that it is more likely to detect dishonest agents in country 1 and charging them the fee m 1 . When e e is very high, the share r does not depend on the threshold and so also tax revenues become constant. The analysis shows that tax revenues for country 1 are highest when the tax system is closest to a ‡at rate regime. When e e ! 0 country 1 is imposing a ‡at rate of t H , while when e e ! 1 the system produces a regime with a ‡at rate of t L . Intermediate values of e e, i.e. a progressive tax system, tends to positively in ‡uence migration and tax evasion, ultimately, to the detriment of tax revenues.
An analogous exercise with chaotic dynamics for the share of cheaters in country 1 is proposed in Figure 4 
Conclusions
Many features of a tax system, including its degree of progressivity and the strictness of the auditing system, have important e¤ects on the decisions of economic agents. Some individuals may …nd desirable to migrate to other countries if they expect to experience an improvement of their (post-tax / post-auditing) utility. In order to study the way tax competition in an international setting may a¤ect economic behavior and in particular the level of tax evasion in the long run, we studied an evolutionary model in which economic agents decide in each period how much e¤ort to invest in economic activities and whether to migrate abroad to a more favorable taxation system.
We considered a two-country setting and studied an evolutionary model in which the fraction of dishonest taxpayers residing in each country is endogenized and updated according to expected utilities and word of mouth dynamics.
We have shown that various dynamic long term scenarios can be generated. Factors that improve the desirability for a dishonest individual to reside in the country with ‡at rate tax system (e.g. improvement in the salary di¤erential and/or auditing penalties, reduction of the ‡at rate) make the system transition from scenarios in which all dishonest individuals migrate to the progressive country to equilibria where dishonest individuals are distributed in both countries. The stability of the interior equilibria may be a¤ected by overshooting. Chaotic cyclical behavior, indeed, may arise if individuals'propensity to migrate is su¢ ciently high. In addition, we have shown that the particular evolutionary trajectory of tax evasion and migration that a country can experience critically depends on the level of progressivity of a tax system. Speci…cally, the progressivity of a tax regime in ‡uences individuals'choices in terms of e¤ort and migration and this, in turn, has consequences on the ability of a country to generate tax revenues. Our analysis shows that considering a ‡at rate system may have positive e¤ects on the tax revenues of a country.
